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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant Jermaine James

Arrats’ petition for post-conviction relief without appointing counsel.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying Criminal Proceedings

On August 30, 2016, Mr. Arrats jumped out of his motel window wearing only socks and
underwear to escape people he believed were chasing him. R. 9. Mr. Arrats encountered a
motorist, forcibly removed him from his vehicle and drove away. Id. The state charged Mr.
Arrats with robbery in violation of I.C. §§ 18-6501 and -6502. R. 16. The parties entered an
I.C.R. 11(f)(1)(C) plea agreement that contemplated an Alford plea and a stipulated sentence of a
unified term of thirty years with a minimum period of confinement ten years. R. 9.
At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Arrats admitted removing the motorist and taking his
vehicle. Tr. (45030)1 p. 10, ln. 20 - p. 11, ln. 7; p. 12, ln. 22 - p. 13, ln. 4. However, Mr. Arrats
explained that his conduct was not robbery because he only intended to escape harm and did not
intend to keep the vehicle. Id. Trial counsel advised the district court that Mr. Arrats was willing
to waive his factual defense in order to take advantage of the plea agreement. Id. at p. 11, ln. 20
- p. 12, ln. 3.

Mr. Arrats is requesting that this Court judicially notice the transcripts prepared in Mr. Arrats
underlying direct appeal, Docket Number 45030, in addition to documents presented in the
district court.
1
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The district court inquired whether Mr. Arrats was willing to accept the plea agreement
despite lacking the intent required to commit robbery. Tr. (45030) p. 14, ln. 19 - p. 15, ln. 4. Mr.
Arrats replied: “Yes, sir. I don't have a million dollars to pay for a high powered attorney to fight
this case” Id. at p. 15, ln. 5-7. Upon inquiry, Mr. Arrats backtracked, indicating that appointed
counsel was a good attorney but would not prevail given the case facts. Id. at p. 15, ln. 16 - p. 16,
ln. 18.
The district court inquired whether Mr. Arrats was concerned that the trial evidence could
cause the district court to impose a harsh sentence. Id. at p. 16, ln. 19-24. Mr. Arrats responded
“yes” but continued: “plus I was in my underwear” running down Chinden, which reinforced that
he did not have the intent to steal. Id. at p. 16, ln. 25 - p. 17, ln. 8. Mr. Arrats explained that 911
calls would show that methamphetamine caused him to hallucinate demons and that he had no
plan to steal a car. Id. at p. 17, ln. 9-25.
The district court suggested presenting his defense to the jury and Mr. Arrats advised he
was unwilling to risk a longer sentence after losing a jury trial. Id. at p. 18, ln. 1-25. Mr. Arrats
advised he suffered from bipolar disorder and was not currently taking any medication. Id. at p.
22, ln. 21 - p. 23, ln. 9. Mr. Arrats otherwise responded appropriately during the remaining plea
colloquy and the district court accepted the plea. Id. at p. 23, ln. 10 - p. 26, ln. 13.
At the time set for sentencing, the district court noted that Mr. Arrats was having “kind of
an emotional reaction” and was contemplating withdrawing his plea and seeking a new attorney.
Id. at p. 29, ln. 11 - p. 30, ln. 15. The district court suggested rescheduling the sentencing to
allow Mr. Arrats additional time to consider his options. Id. at p. 30, ln. 15 - p. 31, ln. 6. Mr.
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Arrats responded: “Today it's important that we do the sentencing,” while also indicating that he
wanted a “fair trial with an attorney that has fire,” that a prison sentence was unwarranted and
that he did not have the intent to steal the motorist’s vehicle. Id. at p. 31, ln. 11 - p. 33, ln. 12. Mr.
Arrats also advised that his attorney had not provided him with full discovery, which was
especially problematic because Mr. Arrats did not remember the night in question. Id. at p. 14, ln.
13-19.
The district court re-scheduled the sentencing for the following week, at which time
counsel advised the district court that Mr. Arrats intended to proceed to sentencing but required
time to review the pre-sentence investigation report. Tr. (45030 4-7-17) p. 5, ln. 6-14. Mr. Arrats
advised the district court he intended to go forward with sentencing because his attorney advised
him that he would be unable to establish his innocence at trial. Id. at p. 5, ln. 25 - p. 6, ln. 5. Mr.
Arrats also indicated the ten year fixed term contemplated by the agreement seemed like “so
freaking much” and he did not have the intent to steal. Id. at p. 6, ln. 22 - p. 7, ln. 25. Mr. Arrats
indicated that while he “hated” his attorney but counsel was correct because “in the eyes of Idaho
and the people of Idaho, this is a scary thing . . . a big black man drove a guy out of his car,
forced himself into the car.” Id. at p. 8, ln. 18-22.
Ultimately, Mr. Arrats reaffirmed his desire to move forward with the sentencing, which
was re-scheduled to afford the opportunity to review the pre-sentence investigation report. Id. at
p. 9, ln. 20 - p. 10, ln. 20. On April 13, 2017, the district court sentenced Mr. Arrats in accord
with the plea agreement. R. 16. Mr. Arrats thereafter challenged his sentence by filing a notice of
appeal through counsel, filing a pro se notice of appeal, and a pro se ICR 35 motion. Id. On May
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16, 2017, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion and Mr. Arrats filed another notice of
appeal. Id. The district court’s denial of the Rule 35 motion was affirmed on direct appeal. State
v. Arrats, 2017 WL 5562527 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2017)
2.

Post-Conviction Proceedings

On April 9, 2018, Mr. Arrats filed a petition for post-conviction relief, supporting
affidavit and motion for appointment of counsel. R. 4-14. Echoing his statements throughout the
criminal proceedings, Mr. Arrats alleged he did not have the intent to permanently deprive the
motorist of his vehicle that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the district court
violated his right to due process. R. 9- 11. Eight days later, the district court issued a notice of
intent to dismiss finding that the petition was subject to summary dismissal. R. 16. The district
court further denied Mr. Arrats’ motion for the appointment of counsel and provided him thirty
days in which to respond. R. 24. Mr. Arrats filed a response continuing to allege that the district
court should have required a trial and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present his
defense. R. 26-61. The district court dismissed Mr. Arrats petition and entered judgment for the
state. R. 33- 35. This appeal follows.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court error in sua sponte summarily dismissing Mr. Arrats petition

for post-conviction relief without judicially noticing the record?
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by dismissing the petition for post-

conviction relief without appointing counsel?
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IV. ARGUMENT
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the petitioner
must prove the allegations in his petition by a preponderance of evidence. I.C. § 19–4907;
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho
234, 238, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015). A petition for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the petitioner’s personal knowledge, and affidavits, records,
or other evidence supporting the petition’s allegations must be attached or the petition must
indicate the reason such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903; see
also Ash v. State, 162 Idaho 535, 537, 400 P.3d 623, 625 (Ct. App. 2017).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief, either pursuant to a party’s motion by or sua sponte, if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted,
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See also Ash, 162 Idaho at 538, 400 P.3d at 626. However, if a petitioner alleges
facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order
to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary
supporting facts. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004); Nelson v.
State, 157 Idaho 847, 854, 340 P.3d 1163, 1170 (Ct. App. 2014)
Here, the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Arrats petition sus sponte
without waiting for the state’s response and after judicially noticing only limited portions of the
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underlying criminal file. Moreover, Mr. Arrats’ petition and the record establish the possibility of
valid claims and the district court therefore abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. Arrats petition
for post-conviction relief without first appointing counsel. Accordingly, this Court should reverse
the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings with the assistance counsel.
A.

The District Court Erred In Sua Sponte Dismissing Mr. Arrats Petition For PostConviction Relief Without Judicially Noticing the Underlying Criminal Record
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(a), the state must respond to the post-conviction

petition “by answer or by motion” within 30 days and, if the record of the challenged
proceedings is not attached to petition, the state must file the portions of the record “that are
material to the questions raised in the application.” Then, when “a court is satisfied, on the basis
of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to postconviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to
the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing.” I.C. § 19-4906(b)
(emphasis added). Section 19-4906(a) imposes the responsibility to pay for the transcripts on the
state and if the state does not file all relevant portions of the transcript in compliance with this
statute, the applicant may move the court to compel the state to do so. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho
644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Ruff v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 1988 (district court obliged to sua sponte obtain and examine state court exhibits under
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(f) when the habeas petitioner is unable to produce the record based on
indigency or other reason).
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Here, the district court did not wait for the state to respond to the petition, instead electing
to issue notice of intent to dismiss only eight days after the Mr. Arrats filed his petition. The
district court decided that Mr. Arrats was entitled to neither counsel nor further proceedings after
reviewing limited portions of the criminal file: on the information; the plea agreement; the
presentence report; the judgment of conviction; the order appointing the SAPD; the Rule 35
motion and related motion for appointment of counsel; the order denying those motions; the four
notices of appeal; and the direct appeal opinion. R. 17. Thus, the district court did not consider
the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings in considering whether Mr. Arrrats
raised the possibility of valid claims regarding the validity of his plea and the effectiveness of his
counsel during plea proceedings.
Nor did the district court notify Mr. Arrats his petition was deficient because records of
the underlying proceedings were not included. It is essential that the district court provide
adequate notice of claimed defects so the petitioner has an opportunity to respond and to give the
trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of the
claims. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
The district court could not properly sua sponte dismiss under Section 19-4906(b) until it
had considered respondent’s “answer or motion, and the record,” material to resolution of the
claims raised in the application. Mr. Arrats challenged the voluntariness of his Alford plea and his
the effectiveness of his attorney’s assistance during plea proceedings. In addition to the records
judicially noticed by the district court, the transcripts of the change of plea hearing and
sentencing hearings were necessary to resolution of Mr. Arrats’ claims. Accordingly, the district
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court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Arrats’ petition for post-conviction relief and this case
must be remanded for further proceedings.
B.

Mr. Arrats Alleged Facts Showing the Possibility of Valid Claims and the District
Court Abused its Discretion in Denying His Motion For Counsel and Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Relief Petition
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay for the expenses of representation, the trial

court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner in preparing the petition, in the trial court,
and on appeal. I.C. § 19–4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at
1111.
However, when considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial court must do
more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007). Instead, if a petitioner who alleges facts that raise to the possibility
of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel and provide the petitioner an
opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112; Nelson v. State, 157 Idaho 847, 854, 340 P.3d
1163, 1170 (Ct. App. 2014). In this analysis, the district court should consider that petitions filed
by a pro se petitioner may be conclusory and incomplete. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493,
95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). An unrepresented petitioner “cannot be expected to know how
to properly allege the necessary facts” and, thus, “every inference must run in the petitioner's
favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time.” Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 342,
223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 794, 102 P.3d at 1113. The district court
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must give adequate notice of claimed defects so the petitioner has an opportunity to respond and
to give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits
of the claims. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
Here, the district court determined that Mr. Arrats was not entitled to the appointment of
counsel because his post-conviction relief petition was\s subject to summary dismissal to. R.
17-19, 24. However, the decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition
if counsel is appointed are controlled by two different standards Swader, 143 Idaho at 655, 152
P.3d at 16. The district court’s notice includes a technical analysis of the legal insufficiency of
Mr. Arrats’ post-conviction claims and failed to meaningfully notify Mr. Arrats — a pro se
prisoner untrained in the law — of deficiencies that he was capable of remedying.
Moreover, the district court penalized Mr. Arrats’ lack of legal ability rather than consider
the limitations of his pro se status. For instance, the district court noted that Mr. Arrats
“confusingly” claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance “during trial,” despite the
Alford plea. R. 20. Then, rather than analyze whether the alleged facts gave rise to a potentially
valid claim, the district court analyzed whether Mr. Arrats pled sufficient facts to meet the
elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Mr. Arrats’ limited legal knowledge is patent from his statements during the underlying
criminal proceedings and his pleadings in this case. However, he has consistently expressed the
factual circumstances he believes gives rise to relief, namely that he pleaded guilty despite
repeated protestations of innocence because his attorney did not provide effective assistance.
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The transcript from the change of plea hearing reveals that Mr. Arrats — who suffers
from bipolar disorder— responded oddly and inconsistently to the district court’s inquiries
regarding satisfaction with counsel and his desire to plead guilty. Mr. Arrats’ conduct in
subsequent hearings also reveals a questionable understanding of the stipulated sentence
contemplated by the plea agreement and problems with counsel, including the allegation Mr.
Arrats had not been allowed to review discovery before entering a plea.
These facts give rise to the possibility that Mr. Arrats received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the course of plea negotiations. The facts also give rise to the possibility of a
valid claim that Mr. Arrats’ Alford plea was not knowing and voluntary. Such a claim is properly
alleged in post-conviction relief unless the claim could have been raised on direct appeal without
factual development, such as where the defendant filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea in the
trial court. See Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 349, 247 P.3d 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2010)
(petitioner not barred from raising claims challenging guilty plea’s validity in post-conviction
relief proceedings where no motion to withdraw the plea was filed and testimony at postconviction evidentiary hearing provided information that was not presented to the district court);
see also Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593–94, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258–59 (Ct. App. 1993)
(petitioner raised constitutional challenge to validity of guilty plea, which may be asserted
through a post-conviction relief application).
The district court abused its discretion in applying the erroneous standard to deny Mr.
Arrats’ motion for counsel in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which failed afford Mr. Arrats with
an opportunity to meaningfully respond and meet the correct standard. Moreover, Mr. Arrats’
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petition alleges facts that raise the possibility of valid claims and the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing his petition without first appointing counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Arrats asks this Court to reverse the judgment for the
state and remand with instruction to appoint counsel.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February 2019
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Jermaine Arrats
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